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ABSTRACT
The main characters in Crime and Punishment refer back to Plato’s dialogue Gorgias. Marmeladov is called an 
“orator” and calls Gorgias to mind, while Raskolnikov is a critic of morality resembling Callicles and calling for 
a new “natural” ethics as Callicles did. Meanwhile the two roles of philosophy joined together in the person of 
Socrates are taken separately by Porfiry (philosophy enforcing morality) and Sonia (wisdom capable of healing 
souls). But Crime and Punishment turns what had been Platonic discourse into practice. The two Lazarus figures in 
the Gospels, both of whom are alluded to in the novel, exemplify the two statuses story-character and real person. 
Callicles represents one, Raskolnikov the other. Raskolnikov executes the morality that Callicles only theorizes. 
Accordingly he needs a therapy beyond the powers of Socratic philosophy, that comes in the form of Sonia. All of 
this is one way to understand the novel’s function as Christian fiction.
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A historical fiction about Socrates
People who work in classical studies often have ideas about the historical fiction they 
could write about antiquity. The ancient world is both fun to think about and hard to learn. 
Why not use fiction to bring it to life?
My own idea was a detective story about Socrates. Socrates knew unsavory types who 
could have wound up killing someone. He made a practice of interrogating people. He could 
well have gone home after the all-night symposium that Plato dramatizes, in his dialogue 
known by that name, to figure out who mutilated the statues of Hermes, or who had been 
mocking the Eleusinian mysteries.
The fantasy of ancient detection collapses under the weight of its own anachronism. 
How does Socrates get people to answer his questions, when no one has police authority? 
What does he do with a correct answer once he finds it, when there is no prosecutor to go to 
with the solution? Anyway murder mystery belongs in the modern world, where the thought 
of agents of justice resolving a case after your death becomes the most imaginable afterlife. 
There is a justice meted out after you die, only you’re not there to see it. Socrates by contrast 
continues to occupy himself imagining an afterlife of a different kind, if we can trust Plato’s 
account of him. He shouldn’t go around solving crimes. Let him take a bath after that all-
night conversation and then continue living the Socratic days we honor him for.
A writer could get around the anachronism by a different strategy. Move Socrates and 
his investigations into the present, so that they exist after the creation of the detective genre. 
Shall we give our detective a symbolical name, like “reasoning man”? Or do we make him 
an official in the bureaucracy of justice, with a name taken from the institutional days of the 
Socratic legacy? Speusippus Holmes has a ring to it. Plotine Maigret is not as good.
At this point the fantasy dissolves away again, but now for the more interesting reason 
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that Crime and Punishment already moved in this direction and covered the territory. After 
Raskolnikov commits his double murder, he faces both the rational capacity of Razumihin, 
whose nature the novel explicitly connects with reason, and the institutional standing of 
Porfiry Petrovich, whose first name echoes that of a neo-Platonist philosopher and student of 
Plotinus. It was a good idea – it still feels like a good idea – but no longer an idea crying out 
from the realm of non-being asking to be brought into existence.
Plato’s Gorgias
Crime and Punishment calls not just Socrates in general to mind, nor merely the genre 
of the Platonic dialogue that gives him his most familiar lines, but above all one dialogue 
in which Socrates presents himself as a vivid character: Plato’s Gorgias. In particular 
Dostoevsky’s characters allude back to the voices in the Gorgias. In some ways the Gorgias 
has a raw tone, not the cheerfulness of those short gemlike works – Euthyphro, Laches – that 
we associate with the questioning philosopher. Socrates is more emphatic than usual in the 
Gorgias, or more emphatic than he pretends to be in other contexts. He urges the extreme 
Socratic paradox, a paradox on the verge of Christian, that it is better to be treated unjustly 
than to act unjustly. 
Meanwhile the character Callicles, who emerges in this dialogue as the great rival to 
Socratic philosophy, speaks more roughly to him than Socratic interlocutors normally do. 
“You will be defenseless when they accuse you, Socrates” (486a-b).
The dialogue’s title comes from the ancient orator who enchanted Athens with his 
euphuistic prose. Some would call the prose not only smooth but sweet. For this reason 
Socrates compares what the orator does with language to what pastry cooks do with sweet 
cakes for children (464c-d); in the Theaetetus that kind of speaker is said to resemble a slave 
who makes sweet sauces for his master’s food (175e). There was something about the style 
of Gorgian rhetoric that impressed and seduced the Athenians; for example the balanced 
sentences in his prose, one phrase set against another. Compared to such language, ordinary 
prose went down like dry bread.
I mention the character Gorgias because in Crime and Punishment, in the scene of 
Raskolnikov’s first conversation with Marmeladov, the man with the sweetened name, the 
narrator calls him an “orator” (Part 1 Chapter 2). Translations say “orator,” but the cognate 
word appears in the original Russian: оратор. And after being called that Marmeladov 
produces prose in the style of Gorgias, contrasting himself with his wife in balanced sentences, 
their antique elegance all the more pathetic as he sums up his very modern degradation: “I am 
a pig but she is a lady... I am a scoundrel, but she is a woman of a noble heart,” etc. 
Callicles and Raskolnikov
That similarity that you notice right away between Gorgias and Crime and Punishment 
connects the aggressive interlocutor Callicles with Raskolnikov, by way of the article we hear 
about in Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov’s publication arguing that the extraordinary 
have the right to commit any crime and generally to transgress laws (Part 3 Chapter 5). 
Raskolnikov expands on the idea when Porfiry asks him about it, calling this right of the 
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extraordinary to ignore morality “a law of nature” and citing examples of such dictators as 
Napoleon and Solon.
Raskolnikov says that such people are able to utter “a new word.” That phrase calls 
Nietzsche to mind, of course, and his act of showing the linguistic legislation that takes place 
when new values are established. Creating a new ethic means renaming values, Nietzsche 
will say. And because moral exceptionalism of this kind is so closely associated with 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, it is hard to hear any voice but his when Porfiry describes the article 
that Raskolnikov wrote. 
We also know about Nietzsche’s fondness for Crime and Punishment, which I do not 
have to rehearse for Dostoevsky’s readers, and about the moment in Turin that marked the 
end of Nietzsche’s sane existence, a break that he signposted by re-enacting the dream scene 
from Dostoevsky about cradling the head of a suffering horse. But that verb “re-enacting” 
misrepresents what Nietzsche did. What Dostoevsky keeps as a story, a mere dream-image 
within his novel, Nietzsche enacts for the first time, taking the act of sympathizing with the 
horse from story to the realm of human reality.
Despite the resemblance in the ideas, Nietzsche is not the first one to talk like 
Raskolnikov; nor would he claim to be. Nietzsche made no secret of his admiration for the 
anti-moral speeches in Plato’s dialogues, the famous being Thrasymachus in Republic Book 
1. And in some respects the speech that Callicles makes in the Gorgias goes further than what 
Thrasymachus says. It is Plato’s most anti-moral passage. Human law, says Callicles, is laid 
down by those who are weak and sickly (483b), who keep the strong in check by lying to 
them about justice (483c). The populace is “a collection of slaves and mixed-up men” (489c). 
Nature shows that it is just for the better to have more than the worse (483c-d), as nature also 
showed – we are told – in Raskolnikov’s article. And just as Raskolnikov sets up Napoleon 
to stand as an exception to moral rules, Callicles points to Greek tyrants.
Tellingly, Callicles does not always live by his own principles. He talks a good game 
but mostly confines himself to speeches. After all it is hard to remain consistent about 
unbridled hedonism, and at one turn in the argument Socrates presses him. This ethos that 
Callicles advocates as true freedom would find its fullest expression in the lives of kinaidoi 
“catamites.” So, does Callicles call them happy (494e)? Callicles recoils from the suggestion. 
What shameful examples for Socrates to be bringing into the discussion, he says.
Because of such moments, in which he veers away from the principles he’d like to 
uphold, Socrates warns him “Callicles, you will not agree with Callicles” (482b). That is 
to say that Callicles will be two people, one of them seeking to overthrow morality and 
the other still attached to the values he knows; somewhat as Raskolnikov is two people in 
Razumihin’s description of him to Raskolnikov’s mother. “It’s as though he were alternating 
between two characters” (Part 3 Chapter 2). As Dostoevsky’s readers observe, the root word 
raskol in his last name already means “schism” or “split.” Raskolnikov has inherited the 
inner contradiction of Callicles together with his fantasy of moral exceptionalism.
The double Lazarus
There is something different about the split in Raskolnikov’s case. Callicles, as I said, 
never takes the step from espousing antisocial principles to acting on them. He doesn’t 
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impose his will on the weak but limits himself to celebrating the tyrants who do (e.g. 510a-
c). The disagreement within Callicles remains a disagreement between one thing he believes, 
or believes himself to believe, and other beliefs of his. By contrast Raskolnikov puts his 
philosophy to work, as you might say, by carrying out his double homicide. He believes one 
thing and does another. This is the type of difference that Crime and Punishment meditates 
upon. 
The difference plays around the borders of the story in the person of Lazarus. And as it 
happens Lazarus is himself a doubled personage. 
Lazarus is an odd two-of-a-kind already in the Gospels. Luke makes him a character in a 
story that Jesus tells, while in the Gospel of John “Lazarus” is the name for a real-life friend 
of Jesus (Luke 16.19-31; John 11.1-44). In the parable told in the Gospel of Luke, Lazarus the 
beggar dies and is comforted, and the possibility of return from the dead is expressly denied. 
In John however Lazarus actually dies and is actually resurrected. We might hypothesize that 
the parable Jesus tells in the more historical chronicle (Luke’s) comes to be remembered as 
an incident in the later one, but for our purposes, reading Dostoevsky, such hypotheses don’t 
matter. The fact at hand is that the Gospels as found material contain this one name attached 
to two characters.
Crime and Punishment contains numerous references to John’s character Lazarus, and 
readers regularly connect that risen man with the rising that Raskolnikov is still capable 
of. But the other Gospel Lazarus makes an appearance too, even though that Lazarus does 
not always show up in English translations of Crime and Punishment. There is a scene in 
Part 3 Chapter 4, when Raskolnikov is about to meet with Zamyotov and Porfiry, and he 
tells himself “I’ll have to sing Lazarus for him, too [Этому тоже надо Лазаря петь].” It 
is striking that only Pevear and Volokhonsky render the Russian phrase Лазаря петь “sing 
Lazarus” into the literal English equivalent. Other translators have Raskolnikov say “I’ll 
have to complain about my lot” or “put on a show,” “pull a long face” or “make the most 
of my illness” (Myers 2014). Although these other translations do a better job of explaining 
what Raskolnikov means, they omit the direct allusion to Lazarus. “Singing Lazarus” meant 
singing a beggar’s song, singing about being poor as the beggar was in Luke, the character 
in a parable, but as the real-life brother of Mary and Martha in John’s Gospel seems not to 
have been.
Maybe because translations do not always retain the “sing Lazarus” words, commentators 
have rarely engaged with this other Lazarus in Crime and Punishment (Ivanits 2004). But 
in a novel that contemplates the divide between thoughts and their performance, or between 
tales and images and the reality of murder, the ontological divide between the two characters 
is a pointer to the distance Dostoevsky marks out between Callicles, the merely obstreperous 
interlocutor, and Raskolnikov the executioner.
The executioner and the new Socrates
As executioner, Raskolnikov draws the attention of the new Socrates. The old Socrates 
already plays the role of something like a cop in Plato’s Gorgias, especially in the myth of 
judgment that Socrates tells at the end of the dialogue. The myth pictures a new moral regime 
in place in the afterlife: Cronus’s dispensation has given way to the underworld reign of 
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Zeus, somewhat as Greek morality of the tragic age is imagined as giving way to Socratic 
morality (Sedley 2009). On the new dispensation, the philosopher belongs in the punishing 
judiciary apparatus, and a malefactor like Callicles will have no choice but to surrender to 
him. Socrates predicts to Callicles that in the next life, “Someone will give you a humiliating 
smack on the head” (527a). 
There is no equivalent eschatology rounding off Crime and Punishment, but then the 
novel comes from the developing genre of murder mysteries, where the afterlife has shifted 
to the present world and eschatology names only what lies beyond an individual’s lifespan. In 
another context I would ask how far the genre of murder mystery depicts an afterlife from the 
victim’s point of view – maybe not an afterlife in which the victim is judge but undoubtedly 
one that brings justice to those who survive the victim. It is in a new fashion that there will 
be justice after you die.
Philosopher and wisdom
So far I have sketched out a friendly comparison between two works, which is all right 
if you like that sort of thing. The comparison makes Dostoevsky an interpreter of Plato, 
as I suppose he would not mind being seen. But it does not capture all of what Socrates 
represents, not even everything he represents within the Gorgias.
Socrates himself draws an elaborate contrast between the philosophy that is legislation 
(or rather, the legislative activity that philosophy would recognize) and the rhetoric that 
Gorgias traffics in (465c). But the philosopher is also like a doctor, most memorably in the 
analogy that imagines children choosing between listening to a physician and to a pastry chef 
(464d-e). On top of that the philosopher resembles a lover. We are told that Callicles has two 
love-objects, the young man Demos who was famous for his beauty (see Aristophanes Wasps 
97), and the Athenian dêmos, the populace, the public; and Socrates for his part loves both the 
fickle young man Alcibiades and that steadfast love-object philosophia (481d-482b). 
In transforming the moral standoff in Plato’s Gorgias into the new level of standoff that 
occupies Crime and Punishment, Dostoevsky reduces the roles for his philosopher Porfiry to 
play, so that Porfiry does less than Socrates – he is less than Socrates. The judiciary institution 
is here, but not philosophy as a curative profession, or not at least in the person of Porfiry. The 
thought of a love-object for Porfiry is some kind of joke. If any character in the dialogue is 
available to heal Raskolnikov and also to have a love-object, that would be Sonia – and here 
we recall that the Russian name Sonia is a diminutive of Sofia, the guide for philosophers. 
Socrates is present not only in the police detective but also in the virtuous teacher of wisdom.
Two opposites to the amoral
How did this change happen, from one foil who confronts Callicles to two? We find two 
crises of shame in Callicles, or two moments in the dialogue where he signals the extent to 
which he finds someone else’s life unlivable, even unimaginable. He looks upon Socrates as 
an object of shame for letting himself remain undefended in the face of likely attacks (486b-
d). For that matter (he says) Socrates went wrong when he remained attached to philosophy, 
that being a child’s kind of preoccupation, and as objectionable to see in adults as baby talk 
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is to hear (485b). Callicles can’t be Socrates. He can’t pretend to think or to act as Socrates 
does.
Second, Callicles cannot imagine living the life of the kinaidos, the adult man who 
wanted to be penetrated by another man – normally a prostitute, or a man equated with 
prostitutes in popular rhetoric. The kinaidos is a loser in the same way that Callicles calls 
Socrates a loser. John Winkler for example writes:
Since sexual activity is symbolic of (or constructed as) zero-sum competition and the restless 
conjunction of winners with losers, the kinaidos is a man who desires to lose. (Winkler, 1990: 186)
As the defeated figures in nature’s competitions between strong and weak, Socrates on 
one hand and the kinaidos on the other represent in Callicles’ eyes the failure to function as 
a powerful free man. Callicles fantasizes only about the victor. And faced with Callicles, 
Socrates with his erotic attachment to philosophia hammers away at the perverse values 
Callicles claims to hold. Unprincipled hedonism is Callicles’ credo, and he will not be 
swayed until that true love of Socrates leads him to the weak point in Callicles’ thoughts. The 
passive homosexual is a pleasure-seeker. There’s the hedonist’s idol! To which Callicles can 
only reply by asking whether Socrates is ashamed of himself.
A man of practice in theory only
Do we say that Dostoevsky needs more agents of reason at work where Plato could 
imagine all their functions being performed by Socrates? That itself could be an Academic 
response, if it means that where a single spontaneously generated philosopher has failed to 
save humanity, a cadre of trained scholars will succeed. But that is not Dostoevsky. It would 
be fairer, although still misguided, to say that Dostoevsky lets himself fantasize in a manner 
that Plato does not, in the act of writing. He creates a narrative of justice, according to the 
demands of the murder mystery, in which what Socrates could only imagine happening in the 
underworld now takes place aboveground, in Saint Petersburg.
But then Plato is not the only limited figure according to this comparison. Callicles has 
not done anything with all his grand ideas. They are a threat to good ethical thinking, but 
there’s no denying they are still in the realm of theory. Callicles has not killed anyone or 
overthrown the old order. All he did was to have some intellectuals stop by his house for 
lunch.
That quote attributed to wise old Anonymous comes to mind: “In theory there is no 
difference between theory and practice. But in practice there is.” Callicles is a man of practice 
in theory only. I don’t say this as a moral condemnation. Even in the epistemological domain, 
theory beats practice, and the idea that “living your skepticism” constitutes an improvement 
over defending skepticism theoretically only makes sense to those who are not living human 
beings. Callicles is saved by his confinement to theory, even if being nothing but talk makes 
him easier to defeat. Socrates wins his agreement – in theory, that is, because after Callicles 
stops answering him Socrates takes over his voice and answers “Yes” to all his own questions.
For that matter Socrates even punishes and rehabilitates Callicles, to the extent that myth 
is reality, by constructing an afterlife in which Callicles is slapped around and corrected. 
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When Crime and Punishment brings the amoral thoughts of Callicles to life, it needs more 
than arguments to set things right. This is one of the things it means to say that Dostoevsky 
writes in a Christian world whose new nature Plato could only have guessed at.
Sonia goes from hypothesis to reality
The heroic man that Callicles dreams about functions as a character in a parable, 
comparable to the Lazarus in Luke. Raskolnikov has no patience with that character and 
even scorns the thought of bringing out the old song about him. It is the other Lazarus who 
seizes his attention, the one we know as a living man, who dies and then lives again, and 
Raskolnikov asks Sonia to show him the passage about his resurrection.
In theory Sonia is a fabricated character. She is wise enough to heal Raskolnikov even 
after her experience of sexual passivity. You might see her as a spinoff from Socrates, 
letting him (in the person of Porfiry) keep the investigator’s march toward justice while she 
appropriates the psychic healing that philosophy once dreamt of accomplishing.
But that’s only the theory, and Sonia matters the way reality matters. She constitutes a 
step from hypothesis into reality, and not only as a healer. For in her person Sonia combines 
the two love objects that Callicles had not wanted to contemplate as objects, let alone as 
objects of his love: philosophy and the kinaidos. These figures are no more than metaphors in 
Socrates’ argument, as Lazarus the beggar is no better than a name in a story. As metaphors 
they don’t reach Callicles’ theory. But put them together into a new kind of character that 
Plato could not have pictured: reason, which Luther had famously called a whore, but this 
time a whore with a heart of gold. The combination is Sonia, not in theory this time but as 
a kind of practice or incarnation, even if (but this is always a possibility for incarnations) 
philosophy will take human form where it is least expected.
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